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Abstract 
This article shows the preliminary results of an 
ongoing study to develop an economically sustainable 
system, which financially rewards individuals with 
diabetes. Previous studies have already shown that 
monetary incentives appear to be the strongest 
motivator for older individuals with type II diabetes. 
Nonetheless, design criteria for a mobile service are 
not well established and there is no study available to 
assess the viability of a system that rewards individuals 
for self-management. Therefore, in this paper we 
explore a design theory, which describes a new mobile 
service that integrates data from other smartphone 
applications to assess therapeutic compliance. Our 
software includes a self-supported lottery in a business 
model, which allows patients with effective self-
management to be rewarded without any deficit. Our 
prototype is based on a social business model, which 
aims at improving patients’ health and that can be 
described as ”healthy” for them.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This article is addressed to designers of diabetes 
management software, and more broadly to patients 
affected by type II diabetes and to their healthcare 
providers. 
We are interested in diabetes management software on 
smartphones or tablets, which helps persons with type 
II diabetes manage the data associated with: (a) blood 
test results from a glucose meter, (b) log entries for 
exercise and other factors coming from pervasive 
systems, (c) coaching for dose corrections. Although 
there is a plethora of websites and mobile applications 
(also known as m-Health apps) for individuals with 
type 2 diabetes, there is a scarcity of reliable data 
concerning their added value for older patients [10]. A 
recent review of internet-based interventions to 
promote lifestyle modification among adults with type 
II diabetes found that (a) successful studies had 
interactive components with tracking and personalized 
feedback and opportunities for peer support, (b) 
website utilization declined over time in all studies and 
concluded that future research is needed on the 
engagement of patients over time [7]. In fact, the 
successful use and potential health benefits related to 
the electronic devices seems to depend more on the 
design of the engagement strategies than on the 
features of their technology [18]. To be effective, 
technologies must be paired with approaches that 
create and maintain engagement [25]. Hence, we 
sought a solution to improve self-management of older 
patients with type II diabetes, using mobile 
technologies and incentives to guide and maintain 
long-term engagement. Therefore, we introduce the 
notion of therapeutic compliance (hereinafter referred 
to as compliance) as patient’s behaviors (in terms of 
taking medication, following diets, or executing life 
style changes) that coincide with healthcare providers’ 
recommendations  for  health  and  medical  advice  
[15,24]. Lack of compliance leads to multiple 
hospitalizations of patients and that significantly 
increases healthcare costs. A study of more than 
600000 patients  with diabetes showed that among 
those who had been hospitalized, 30% had two or more 
stays accounting for 50% of total hospitalizations and 
hospital costs [14]. Thus, we look for a solution to 
reduce those costs. A recent review of diabetes apps 
for iOS and Android operating systems examined 
whether the available applications serve the special 
needs of diabetes patients aged 50 or older by 
performing an expert-based usability evaluation. The 
authors suggested that (a) patients and physicians alike 
should be involved in the app development process to a 
greater extent, and that (b) the usability of diabetes 
apps for patients aged 50 or older was moderate to 
good, but this result applied mainly to apps offering a 
small range of functions [1]. Another study 
demonstrated that mobile phone-based treatment and 
behavioral coaching intervention had a positive impact 
on the reduction of glycated hemoglobin (HbA1c) 
levels over one year in patients with type II diabetes 
[28]. Previous studies have already shown that 
monetary incentives appear to be a strongest motivator 
for older patients affected by type II diabetes [5]. 
Nonetheless, there are no clear recommendations to 
design a mobile service and there is no study available 
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to assess whether a system that financially rewards 
patients could be economically viable. Therefore, our 
research question is: how to design a mobile service 
that uses financial incentives to increase patient’s 
compliance? 
The rest of the paper proceeds as it follows. In section 
two, we briefly introduce the recent stream of research 
concerning financial incentives to increase patient’s 
compliance. In section three we describe our design 
theory and in section four we illustrate an example to 
show how our mobile service could be financially 
viable. Section five addresses legal aspects related to 
our revenue model and section six describes a business 
model associated to our service. Finally, section seven 
and section eight conclude the paper by discussing its 
limitations and by showing some directions for further 
investigation. 
2. Literature review  
 
In this section we briefly highlight few papers related 
to our study and we underline the knowledge gap. 
Therapeutic compliance. The compliance rate of 
long-term medication therapies can be estimated 
between 40% and 50%. The rate of compliance for 
short-term therapy is much higher (between 70% and 
80%), while the compliance with lifestyle changes is 
the lowest (20%–30%) [8]. A systematic review of 102 
articles has identified five types of factors, which affect 
non-compliance: (a) patient-centered, (b) therapy-
related, (c) social and economic, (d) healthcare system, 
and (e) disease [15]. 
Design of financial incentives for patient’s 
compliance. The analysis of four systematic reviews 
of reward-based financing has found that financial 
incentives targeting recipients of healthcare is effective 
in the short run for simple and distinct, well-defined 
behavioral goals, whereas there is less evidence that 
financial incentives can sustain long-term changes 
[17]. Since people place more weight on the present 
than the future costs, a system designed to increase the 
immediate rewards may influence people’s propensity 
to act, by lowering the social and economic factors that 
lead to non-compliance. Hence, studies on behavioral 
economics emphasize (a) the importance of frequent 
feedback and incentives, (b) the motivational power of 
lotteries regarding other financial features and (c) the 
motivation force of anticipated regret [28]. 
Lottery systems for diabetes management software. 
Financial incentives for diabetes self-management have 
only begun to be explored. Individuals expect financial 
incentives to be a stronger motivation for behavioral 
change [4], even though incentives for behaviors are 
preferred for tasks which are considered less 
challenging [5]. Lottery-based incentives improve 
monitoring rates among patients with uncontrolled 
diabetes, and it seems that the smaller expected value 
lottery ($1.40/day) is considerably more effective in 
the post-incentives period than the larger expected 
value lottery ($2.80) [25].  
3. Methodology  
 
Since we did not find a theory to design a system that 
addresses our research question, we apply design 
science, which addresses so-called wicked problems 
and seeks out usefulness, rather than truth [13]. We 
follow the guidelines of Gregor and Jones [12] to 
describe the eight components of a design theory. In 
this section we describe the six core components, 
whereas in the next two sections we describe the two 
additional components. 
Purpose and scope. The purpose of our mobile service 
is to increase the therapeutic compliance of patients 
with type II diabetes. We take into account that there 
are two sets of users: (a) younger patients, who are 
more familiar with smartphones and have to plan their 
adult life taking into account their diabetes, and (b) 
older patients, who might need assistance to use a 
smartphone and, after the occurrence of diabetes, need 
to change a lifestyle, which they have been keeping for 
several decades. 
Constructs. Our design theory has four constructs to 
describe the system: (1) the short-term and the long-
term evolution of the patient’s clinical situation, (2) the 
monetary incentives, (3) the change in the healthcare 
provider efficiency and (4) the change in the 
motivation of the patient. The short-term improvement 
of the patient’s condition can be measured by the 
adherence to medication and the meetings with the 
healthcare provider, which are reported in the patient’s 
logbook. The sustainable change of the patient can be 
measured by mobile applications that monitor (a) the 
level of blood glucose, (b) the level of HbA1c and (c) 
the Body Mass Index. The monetary incentives are 
measured by the money delivered to the patient. 
Finally, the healthcare provider efficiency can be 
measured by the average amount of hours spent with 
the patient, whereas patient’s motivation can be 
measured by a survey that assess intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation [20].  
Functions of the artefact. Figure 1 represents the two 
functions of the system by using two rectangles. The 
healthcare provider and the patient affected by diabetes 
meet to set the goals, in terms of diet, exercise, 
medications and smoking cessation. We assume that 
the patient uses a set of devices to automatically collect 
data every day, whereas we also expect the healthcare 
provider to spend some time to set up the platform at 
the beginning. 
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Figure 1: Description of how goals are set, data is analyzed, and rewards are given 
 
This assumption is based on mobile applications like 
myDiabeticAlert, which contains two roles: patient and 
healthcare provider. Our system gathers all the 
information collected by other mobile applications into 
one single database. Hence, although we consider our 
service as mobile, we do not create our own mobile 
application, because we prefer to focus on one 
complementary component, which can be easily 
integrated to other applications. Instead, we develop an 
application that (a) collects data using the Application 
Programming Interfaces (API) of other mobile 
applications, (b) checks on the back-end if the data is 
aligned with the goals, and (c) assigns a lottery ticket 
to each day the patient is compliant. At the end of each 
week, a lottery is done and the patient is notified of the 
result by email.  
Kernel theories. Our design theory extends the work 
about financial incentives for patients affected by type 
II diabetes [4,5,25].  
Testable propositions. By using our four constructs, 
we derive two sets of propositions. As a starting point, 
we need to prove that the platform is economically 
viable without being profitable, due to ethical concerns 
and legal requirements in some countries. As it turns 
out, most lottery systems were designed to be fairly 
profitable and their approach needed to be modified to 
fulfill our expectations. Therefore, our platform is 
conceived to assure that compliant participants will 
receive the service for free, while collecting enough 
resources to cover operational costs.  
P1: Monetary incentives will cover the inscription 
cost of participants that comply with doctor 
prescriptions. 
We also believe that the random rewards delivered by 
e-mail will motivate the patients without requiring any 
additional effort on their side. Moreover, we seek to 
increase patients’ self-management on the long term.  
P2: The way monetary incentives are used in the 
system will increase patient’s intrinsic motivation. 
Artefact mutability. The system can be customized 
according to (1) its financial incentives to keep users 
on the platform and (2) its functionalities. We claim 
that our system adapts its rewards to let participants 
shift from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation, following 
the four steps of the self-determination continuum [23]. 
We reward every patient, who tries to comply. A 
patient, who complies only one day each week and gets 
a single lottery ticket, will win something eventually. 
This reward will allow passing from external 
regulation (step 1) to internal regulation (step 2). 
Nonetheless, the system penalizes the patients, who do 
not give personal importance to the exercise and 
comply only to win money. Indeed, if all patients fully 
comply, they will earn less and less money over time. 
Therefore, financial incentives over time should be 
used as a reminder of the ongoing effort, to increase 
consciousness and awareness and to shift towards 
identified regulation (step 3) and integrated regulation 
(step 4).  
Possible extensions of the lottery system could include 
gamification and social media components. 
Nonetheless, most of these requirements are already 
fulfilled by existing applications for smartphones.  
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 Table 1: Example of a lottery system auto-financed by 100 patients with type II diabetes  
Variable Code Formula Values Comments 
Number of participants N  10000 We assume to have 10000 participants 
Weekly inscription price WIP  $1 Each patient pays $1 in advance to enter the system 
Weekly revenues WR N*WIP $10000  Every week the system handles $10000    
Financial support FSI  $ 0  The patient’s insurance does not sponsor this system 
Total revenue TR WR + FSI $10000 The weekly revenue depends on the number of participants 
Profit Pr  5% A percentage of the revenue cover the costs of the platform 
Total game revenue TGR TR*(1-Pr) $9500  Every week, $9500 are distributed across the winners  
Patient’s compliance C  [0-7] Each patient complies somewhere between 0 and 7 days per week 
Expected Compliance EC  3 Each patient is expected to comply 3 days per week on average 
Winning probabilities P C/7 [0-100%] If the patient complies every day, the system delivers 7 tickets every week 
Expected winners EW N*EC/7 4300 The number of winners is assumed to be 10000*3/7=4286 
Expected Rewards ER TGR / EW $2.22 A participant, who paid $1 and complies, should expect to receive $2.22 
 
4. Example of implementation 
 
In this section, we describe how to implement the 
lottery function of our system and we offer an 
illustratory instantiation by means of a basic example. 
For sake of simplicity, we assume that the only goal set 
by the doctor for all the patients is to do 10000 steps 
per day and that such goal is measured by a Fitbit and 
shared via its API [11]. In the fourth column of table 1, 
we assign fictive values to a set of variables, which are 
listed in the first column and that are needed to assess 
the revenue model of our service. Table 1 shows how 
to assess the profitability of the system. In our 
illustratory example, a winning participant earns up to 
2.2 times what was initially spent, whereas the 
platform can cover its cost to not lose money at the end 
of the year. Such results can be explained by the fact 
that each winner receives most of the money from 
those who did not comply. To confirm our intuition, 
we wrote a simple script using R statistical package 
[22] to perform a simulation that used four matrixes, 
which had 10000 rows (one for each participant, and 
52 columns (one for each week of the year). 
Simulations are listed among the techniques for 
artificial evaluations of design research, which allows 
to assess the performance of the system in different 
hypothetical conditions [27]. As shown in table 2, the 
first matrix is PART, which has random numbers 
between 0 and 7 that simulate the tickets received by 
the participants. The number 3 implies that the Fitbit 
data collected from participant P1 shows that she has 
walked more than 10000 steps three days out of seven, 
during the first week W1.  
The second matrix is ROULE, which has random 
numbers between 1 and 7 that simulate the individual 
roulettes. A participant with more tickets has more 
chances to win, since she is considered to be a winner 
if the value of PART (her tickets) is equal or greater 
than the value of ROULE (the outcome of her 
roulette). The first week (a) P1 lost because she has 3 
tickets but the number on her roulette is 4, (b) P3 lost 
because she needed 6 tickets to win, whereas (c) P2 
won because she has 2 tickets and the number on her 
roulette is 1. 
The third matrix is WIN, which has the list of winners 
every week. Each week, the system defines the weekly 
reward by distributing the total amount (3*0.95= 2.85 
in the example) among the winners.  
The fourth matrix is USD, which multiplies the weekly 
reward WR by the values of WIN to assess how much 
each participant has won at the end. The Yearly 
Reward YR is the sum of the money won each week.  
In this example, the YR of each participant is slightly 
below the amount of money that they paid to enter the 
game ($3 for 3 weeks, whereas the money kept for the 
platform is 3*5%=$0.14 for each participant). 
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Table 2: Example with 3 participants over three weeks 
 
(a) weekly compliance of participants 
 PART W1 W2 W3 
P1 3.00 7.00 2.00 
P2 2.00 1.00 2.00 
P3 4.00 7.00 5.00 
(b) random results of individual lotteries 
ROULE W1 W2 W3 
P1 4.00 1.00 1.00 
P2 1.00 5.00 4.00 
P3 6.00 0.00 1.00 
(c) weekly winners and weekly rewards 
WIN W1 W2 W3 
P1 0.00 1.00 1.00 
P2 1.00 0.00 0.00 
P3 0.00 1.00 1.00 
WR 2.86 1.43 1.43 
(d) weekly amount won by each participant 
USD W1 W2 W3 YR 
P1 0.00 1.43 1.43 2.86 
P2 2.86 0.00 0.00 2.86 
P3 0.00 1.43 1.43 2.86 
 
To test our first proposition, we ran a simulation with 
random numbers for 10000 participants over 52 weeks. 
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the yearly 
revenues. The median of our simulated results is close 
to zero (a participant can expect to receive back the 
money initially spent). Moreover, figure 2 shows that 
everyone is expected to win something between $20 
and $80. Therefore, proposition P1 (monetary 
incentives will cover the inscription cost of participants 
that comply with doctor prescriptions) appears to be 
validated. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of YR (USD VS frequency) 
 
Nonetheless, in our following simulations we took into 
account that the compliance degree among patients 
with type II diabetes cannot be expected to be normally 
distributed, due to the effort required to change the 
lifestyle of a person.  
Therefore, we created a set of matrixes PART with 
random numbers generated by using a Poisson 
distribution. Figure 3 shows what would happen with a 
population of patients that comply less than 2 days per 
week (lambda =1), which is compared to a population 
that complies up to seven days per week (when a 
simulated participant complies more than 7 days per 
week, the value is set at 7).   
 
 
 
   Figure 3: Compliant days VS frequency (λ=1; λ=3) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that, when most people do not 
comply (lambda=1), those who comply can expect to 
win a significant amount of money at the end of the 
year. Nonetheless, as a growing number of participants 
become motivated to comply (lambda=3), the weekly 
rewards get smaller and the expected YR gets closer to 
the one shown in figure 2. Therefore, the system is 
meant to use extrinsic motivation as an enabler for 
intrinsic motivation. Therefore, proposition P2 (the 
way monetary incentives are used in the system will 
increase patient’s intrinsic motivation) appears to be 
validated. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: YR: USD VS frequency (λ=1; λ=3) 
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5. Legal aspects 
 
Since our service will be initially tested in Switzerland, 
our analysis will focus on legal aspects of our business 
model with respect to Swiss regulations, which are 
threefold. Our lottery model (a) is related to an m-
health application, (b) has the possibility to give 
finance incentives to participants and (c) has not 
financial activities.  
a) Our software is an application for wellbeing. So far, 
m-health applications are subjected to no specific 
legislation in Switzerland. However, according to the 
Directive 93/42/EEC [9] we can use the definition of 
medical device to claim that our application concerns 
wellbeing, since it does not give any therapeutic or 
diagnostic advice.: According to article 1, paragraph 
2(a), ”‘medical device’ means any instrument, 
apparatus, appliance, software, material or other 
article, whether used alone or in combination, 
including the software intended by its manufacturer to 
be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic 
purposes and necessary for its proper application, 
intended by the manufacturer to be used for human 
beings for the purpose of: (a) diagnosis, prevention, 
monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease, (b) 
diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or 
compensation for an injury or handicap,  (c) 
investigation, replacement or modification of the 
anatomy or of a physiological process, (d) control of 
conception”. Therefore, our platform can be classified 
as a wellbeing application, which falls under the 
Directive 2011/83/EU [6] on consumer' rights 
especially in case of distance contracts (art. 2) and 
data protection (art. 62). 
b) Our online lottery system does not seek for profit 
and aims at common good. The online lottery system 
in Switzerland is regulated by the article 106, al. 1 of 
the Federal Constitution, which distinguishes between 
two kinds of gaming, i.e. casino gambling and 
betting/lotteries. Our system is related to the Federal 
Act on Lotteries and Commercial Betting of 8 June 
1923 [2], which defines a lottery as “any operation that 
offers, in exchange for payment or at the conclusion of 
a contract, the chance to realize a material benefit 
consisting of a lot, the acquisition, size or nature of 
this lot being subordinated to, according to a plan, 
numbers or titles randomly drawn, or to some similar 
method” (art. 1). Since our model is economically 
viable but it does not seek for profit, our service falls 
into the category of lotteries, which benefit charities or 
the common good and that are allowed by Swiss 
regulation (art. 3). Indeed, our system respects the 
following conditions: a) it acts in favor of the general 
interest, b) it allocates its funds exclusively to the 
pursuit of these goals, c) exercises actually its activity, 
d) it targets a broad circle of participants, e) it acts 
selflessly and f) it refrains from engaging in 
commercial activities. Finally, our system will have to 
comply to the Federal Law on money laundering [3], 
which imposes the control to the gamer’s identity in 
case of online games (ch.2, sec. 1, art 3).  
c) Our lottery is not a financial activity. Our platform 
does not stock money for its users, and it should not be 
confused with banking and financial services. Indeed, 
each participant transfers the money directly to the 
association at the beginning of the year. Since, the 
ownership of the money is transferred, our service 
cannot be qualified as a financial intermediary service 
according to the Swiss Independent Supervisory 
Authority for the Financial Markets (FINMA). 
6. Business model of the mobile service 
 
In this section we illustrate the different components of 
the business model enabled by our mobile service 
(figure 5). As mentioned above, our artefact is the 
design theory describing our lottery system, which has 
been tested ex-ante by simulation, whereas the 
business model gives a further view on the expected 
functionalities and logic of the system. We refer to the 
eight components of the business model canvas [16], to 
briefly highlight why our service is expected to be 
economically viable. We describe a solution for a small 
team of 5 people; this team could be composed of 
employees of a hospital, which wants to reduce its 
hospitalization costs, or it could be part of a private 
firm that wants to implement a social business model 
(we do not take into account here the startup that seeks 
for acquisition by a larger player). 
Customer segments. For sake of simplicity, we focus 
here on the three main customer segments: (a) patients, 
(b) caregivers/healthcare providers and (c) insurance 
firms. Patients should be considered both as users and 
clients. Indeed, they should invest some money in 
order to be motivated to improve their lifestyle. In our 
simulation, we have suggested that a community of 
10000 patients can be reached, even though that will 
require a significant amount of effort to promote the 
service and to manage the community of patients. In 
comparison, a service such as “Patient like me” claims 
to have 380000 patients contributing health data on 
over 2500 diseases [19]. Therefore, healthcare 
providers would be key players for the success of the 
service, by promoting the mobile service to their 
patients in order to reduce the number of 
hospitalizations due to lack of compliance. Healthcare 
providers can choose to receive a report about patients’ 
compliance, as a complement to the information 
already offered by other applications such as 
myDiabeticAlert. Finally, insurance firm could decide 
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to sponsor this service as a way to reduce the cost of 
hospitalization, in their own interest and in the interest 
of their clients. Nonetheless, in this article we assume 
that the insurance does not pay for this service. 
Value propositions. The service offers a new way to 
use extrinsic motivation to improve the patients’ 
compliance. This idea is presented to patients as a tool 
that properly rewards their efforts, whereas it is 
presented to healthcare providers and insurance firm as 
a way to reduce the costs of multiple hospitalizations. 
Customer relationship. The service offers feedback 
every week to every patient by delivering a reward, 
even though the interaction with patients is fairly 
standardized to reduce operational costs and to focus 
the “job to be done”. On the one hand, the interaction 
with patients and healthcare providers is kept to the 
minimum in order to not give the impression of an 
additional application (the overall systems needs to be 
initially setup and then it automatically collects data 
and gives updates every week). On the other hand, the 
interaction with insurance firm is extremely limited 
due to privacy concerns. 
Channels. Patients are reached by online promotion or 
advised by healthcare providers (for sake of simplicity, 
we do not take into account patients associations), 
whereas professional caregivers can be reached with 
specialized publications and talks at professional 
gatherings.  The service is delivered to patients and 
healthcare providers by e-mail, as a complement to 
dashboards already offered by other mobile 
applications. Insurance firms do not really interact with 
the system and are most likely interested in 
presentations about the overall performance of the 
system. 
Key activities. A crucial task for the success of the 
platform consists in the acquisition and retention of 
patients, since the simulation has shown how the 
average cost for each participant gets closer to zero as 
soon as the degree of compliance among participants 
resembles to a normal distribution. Hence, marketing 
efforts and community management have the highest 
priority as well as the tasks required to assure that the 
system can automatically collect and analyze the 
sensor data about each patient. 
Key resources. On the one hand, the lottery system 
and the know-how associated to its way of working are 
a valuable set of resources. On the other hand, the 
community of patients and healthcare providers is what 
keeps the overall service alive. Moreover, we list the 
patient’s data among the key resources, as a reminder 
of all the privacy concerns associated with medical 
records. Patients’ data is initially collected and stored 
by other applications and one could decide to erase the 
data every week, once the winners are declared, as long 
as there is no need to audit the lottery system 
afterwards. 
Key partners. The patients and healthcare providers 
are important partners to promote the service among 
patients; hence they should be considered both partners 
and customers. Moreover, professional caregivers 
could take part as medical advisors during the research 
and development process. Smartphone applications 
that collect data about the patients are key partners, 
since they allow reducing the cost for data collection 
and software development. Nonetheless, the risk 
associated to outsourcing these tasks is related to the 
high degree of uncertainty concerning the evolution of 
the ecosystem of these applications, both in terms of 
merge and acquisition and in terms of survival rate. 
This could lead to significant cost for constant 
adaptation of the interfaces between our platform and 
the other applications. 
Cost structure. A large part of the inscription fees 
goes back to the patients. The remaining part of the 
revenues should be used for marketing & sales and for 
research & development. As previously mentioned, our 
cost structure assumes a small team of five people, 
which has externalized most of the tasks. 
Revenue model. Assuming that the service reaches a 
community of 10000 participants, one could expect the 
patients inscription fee to shift from $1 per week to $1 
per day, leading to a revenue flow of some $180000 
from the 5% commission rate. Indeed, even though a 
subscription fee of $365 per year might discourage a 
larger amount of patients, this cost is less than the 
subscription for a gym and our simulation shows that 
compliant patients will have most of their money back 
at the end of the year. If we assume an inscription fee 
of $1 per day, it would be possible to devolve a certain 
amount of collected money to support social projects, 
in accordance to Swiss regulations. The revenue flow 
associated to the doctors might seem reasonable but it 
will not bring a significant amount of revenues until 
the system has been tested according to hospital 
standards. In the first year, some money could come 
from research projects to assess the feasibility of the 
model, but this should not be seen as a sustainable 
solution. Therefore, a partnership with some insurance 
firms might be required, even though that option brings 
questions related to privacy concerns and potential 
conflicts of interest. 
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Figure 5: Business model of our mobile service 
 
7. Discussions 
 
In this section we address the main remarks received 
from field experts. 
A preliminary work. In this article we describe a 
design theory [12] and we illustrate an example of 
implementation by means of a simulation. Artificial  
evaluation  can be seen as unreal  due to (a) unreal  
users,  (b) unreal  systems,  and  (c)  unreal  problems  
(not  held  by  the users and/or not real tasks, etc.) 
[26]. Nonetheless, Pries-Heje et al. [21] recommend 
to use this type of artificial evaluation as an ex-ante 
assessment of the system, before testing it on larger 
scale with real users (naturalistic evaluations). 
A new way to use patient’s data to reduce the cost of 
multiple hospitalizations. Our approach offers a 
complementary way to use data from pervasive 
systems for e-health and it focuses on the decrease in 
patient’s motivation over time, the limited time of 
professional caregivers to perform a personal follow-
up of each patient and the costs of hospitalizations 
associated to lack of patient compliance. We move 
beyond the reliability of data presented by mobile 
applications, since we consider this data as a 
feedback for the patient and not a reliable tool for a 
professional caregiver.  
A new set of complex problems to address. Our 
design theory opens new directions of investigations 
concerning complex issues such as (1) input: how can 
healthcare providers set goals that can be measured 
by smartphones applications? (2) output: how to 
compare the effect of monetary incentives with 
respect to traditional solutions already included in 
mHealth applications? (3) business model: how does 
the business model change if we take into account the 
contribution of insurance firms (privacy, revenue 
model, lottery system)?  
8. Conclusions  
 
This article illustrates the preliminary results of an 
ongoing study that describes a new component for 
diabetes management software, which uses financial 
incentives to increase patient compliance.  
By following the guidelines for a design theory, we 
describe a system, which combines existing mobile 
applications to support an economically sustainable 
lottery with a business model that rewards compliant 
patients without financial deficit. 
Our design theory has been only tested by simulation 
as an ex-ante assessment and it requires empirical 
testing to confirm its validity. Nonetheless, we 
believe that our research opens new interesting 
directions of investigations to include financial 
rewards in diabetes management software to improve 
patient compliance, which may also apply to other 
chronic diseases other than diabetes. 
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10. Annex 1: The code used for the 
simulation using R 
 
#PARAMETERS 
N=10000  
WIP=1  
D=52  
WR=N*WIP  
FSI= 0   
TR= WR+FSI  
Pr= 0.05  
TGR=TR*(1-Pr)   
 
#SIMULATION 1: Normal distribution 
library(truncnorm) 
ECN=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
EC1N=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
sigma=1 
n=seq(1:N) 
d=seq(1:D) 
mean=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
 
for (i in d) { 
  for (j in n) { 
    set.seed(j*i) 
    mean[j,i]=sample(1:7,1,T) 
    ECN[j,i]=round(rtruncnorm(1,a=0, 
b=7,round(mean[j,i]),sigma),0)     
  } 
} 
for (i in d) { 
  for (j in n) {     
    if  (ECN[j,i] > sample(1:7,1,T)) { 
      EC1N[j,i ] <- 1  
}  else {  
      EC1N[j,i ] <- 0 
    } 
  } 
} 
aN=TGR/apply(EC1N,2,sum) 
IW=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
for (j in n) { 
  IW [j,]=aN*EC1N[j,] 
} 
plot.ts (cumsum(IW[1,]-1),ylim=c(-20,20)) 
for (j in 1:100){ 
  points(cumsum(IW[j,]-1),col=j,type="l") 
} 
winning=apply(IW,1,cumsum)-52 
hist(winning[52,], main="Rewards after one 
year",xlab="USD",col="red") 
hist(aN, main="Compliant days",xlab="Tickets",col="red") 
 
#SIMULATION 2: Poisson distribution 
ECP=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
EC1P=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
n=seq(1:N) 
d=seq(1:D) 
lambda=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
for (i in d) { 
  for (j in n) { 
    set.seed(j*i) 
    lambda[j,i]=1 
    ECP[j,i]=rpois(1,round(lambda[j,i])) 
  } 
} 
for (i in d) { 
  for (j in n) { 
    if  (ECP[j,i] > sample(1:7,1,T)) { 
      EC1P[j,i ] <- 1 } 
    else {  
      EC1P[j,i ] <- 0       
    } 
  } 
} 
NP=TGR/apply(EC1P,2,sum) 
IWP=matrix(rep(0,N*D),N,D) 
for (j in n) { 
  IWP [j,]=NP*EC1P[j,] 
} 
plot.ts (cumsum(IWP[1,]-1),ylim=c(-30,30)) 
for (j in 1:100){ 
  points(cumsum(IWP[j,]-1),col=j,type="l") 
} 
winningP=apply(IWP,1,cumsum)-52 
 
hist(winningP[52,]) 
hist(winnigP[52,], main="Rewards after one year (Lambda=1) 
",xlab="Returns",col="green") 
hist(ECP, main="Compliant days 
(Lambda=1)",xlab="wins",col="green") 
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